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Abstract 
! Networks can be vast and complicated entities consisting of both servers and 
workstations that contain information sought by attackers.  Searching for specific data in 
a large network can be a time consuming process.  Vast amounts of data either passes 
through or is stored by various servers on the network.  However, intermediate work 
products are often kept solely on workstations.  Potential high value targets can be 
passively identified by comparing user email traffic against predefined profiles.  This 
method provides a potentially smaller footprint on target systems, less human interaction, 
and increased efficiency of attackers.  Collecting user email traffic and comparing each 
word in an email to a predefined profile, or a list of key words of interest to the attacker, 
can provide a prioritized list of systems containing the most relevant information.   
This research uses two experiments.  The functionality experiment uses randomly 
generated emails and profiles, demonstrating MAPS (Merritt’s Adaptive Profiling 
System) ability to accurately identify matches.  The utility experiment uses the Enron 
email corpus and meaningful profiles generated by onelook.com.  This experiment 
further demonstrating MAPS ability to accurately identify matches with non-random 
input.  A meaningful profile is a list of words bearing a semantic relationship to a topic of 
interest to the attacker. 
Results for the functionality experiment show MAPS can parse randomly 
generated emails and identify matches with an accuracy of 99 percent or above.  The 
utility experiment using an email corpus with meaningful profiles, show slightly lower 
v!
!
accuracies of 95 percent or above.  Based upon the match results, network attack priority 
lists are generated.  A network attack priority list is an ordered list of systems, where the 
potentially highest value systems exhibit the greatest fit to the profile.  An attacker then 
uses the list when searching for target information on the network to prioritize the 
systems most likely to contain useful data.  
vi!
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Research Motivation 
 In a typical computer attack scenario, entry is gained to a network via a node 
accessible from the Internet.  After gaining access, the attacker scans through the network 
looking for the target information.  Attackers search for clues that provide them with the 
location of the data that they seek, such as systems hosting databases, web servers, and 
domain controller services.  These systems often contain information the attacker is 
interested in harvesting.  The intruder may also attempt to remain in place on a 
compromised server, capturing data being transmitted across the network such as 
unencrypted emails, web traffic, and other types of network traffic.  Despite the 
information gathering capability of an attacker’s presence on a compromised server, 
workstations can also provide valuable information to attackers.  
1.1.1 Attacker Limitations 
Attackers face several problems by limiting their presence to servers.  These 
limitations include:  (1) information the attacker seeks may be encrypted on a 
workstation; (2) documents users create can be stored exclusively on their workstation; 
and (3) web traffic is encrypted between the workstation and the destination server, 
which prevents anyone with a presence on the server from intercepting the 
communications.  Without knowing what information is contained by which system, the 
attacker must gain access to all systems on the network. 
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1.1.2 Networks 
In many enterprise networks, the majority of the workstations applications are 
similarly configured and cloned from a single configured copy of an operating system.  
Therefore, profiling a specific workstation and the identity of the user of the workstation 
is a difficult task for attackers.  Compounding the difficulty of finding the target 
containing the information being sought, it is paramount that the attacker is able to 
remain stealthy while performing reconnaissance [ScW00].   
1.1.2.1 Workstations 
By establishing a presence on workstations throughout the network the attacker is 
able to harvest information such as user credentials, encrypted email traffic, web 
browsing data, and local documents that are currently being accessed or edited by a user. 
Gaining access to each system on the network and searching each system for the target 
information can be extremely time consuming and labor intensive process.  Generating a 
priority listing of the systems most likely to contain the target information increases the 
efficiency of the attackers while lowering the potential of detection by the network 
defenders. 
1.2 Research Objectives 
The goal of this research is to investigate passive methods of identifying potential 
high value targets by comparing user email traffic against predefined profiles.  The 
following steps are derived in pursuit of this goal: 
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1. Collect email traffic on a windows workstation and compare the emails to a 
predefined profile sending the matches to the C2 server.   
2. Verify the ability to successfully identify and report matches from a random 
profile with a random set of emails.  
3. Verify the research goal by loading semantically-related profiles and utilizing the 
Enron email corpus [Enr03] to determine if a network attack priority listing can 
be derived. 
 
This method provides a potentially smaller footprint on target systems, less human 
interaction, and increased efficiency of attackers. 
1.3 Approach 
 The research goal is accomplished by monitoring for emails being sent from a 
notional email application.  The text of the emails are compared against a pre-determined 
profile and matches are recorded along with the sender’s email address by MAPS 
(Merritt’s Adaptive Profiling System).  These matches are sent to the C2 server, which 
adds the matches to a database.  The attacker can then query the database to obtain the 
email address, internal and external IP address, the MAC address of each system, as well 
as the matches they contain.  A random profile and random emails are generated from a 
word list and parsed by MAPS to verify its ability to detect matches.  Finally, the email 
corpus is sanitized, removing extraneous data from the emails.  This research focuses on 
the email author’s address and the body of the message.  MAPS parses the corpus and 
compares the text to profiles generated by a dictionary website to verify MAPS abilities 
to identify matches with semantically related profiles and an email corpus.  From these 
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matches, network attack priority listings can be derived.  The resulting prioritized list 
informs the attacker concerning which victim systems appear to contain the most relevant 
information. 
1.4 Research Assumptions 
This research accepts several assumptions in order to accomplish the research 
goal.  These assumptions are as follows: 
 
• The attacker has remote access to victim systems without the knowledge of the 
user using a form of undetected malware. 
• Each system on the target network is able to send data to the C2 server using 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)/Internet Protocol (IP). 
• Any and all applications are installed necessary to the execution of MAPS. 
• The English language is the only language that MAPS is capable of parsing.   
• All emails are written using ASCII characters only, and no punctuation is used in 
the emails with the exception of the @ sign in email addresses.  The Enron email 
corpus is sanitized of all punctuation in the message bodies.    
 
1.5 Thesis Overview 
 The remaining structure of this document is as follows.  Chapter two contains 
background information including a discussion of profiling techniques, a standard attack 
model, and a discussion of state-of-the-art methods for finding and retrieving data on a 
network.  Chapter three contains the detailed methodology utilized to implement the 
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various applications, which intercept, analyze, and transmit the results to the C2 server.  
The methodology also includes details on the experimental setup used to validate the 
research concept.  Chapter four discusses the validation process for MAPS as well as the 
experimental results. Finally, Chapter five summarizes the research, the methodology, 
suggested future work, and the results making some final conclusions about the research.
! 6!
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Overview  
 This chapter provides background and overviews of topics related to this research.  
Section 2.2 provides three methodologies for creating profiles describing users.  Section 
2.3 defines a network attack priority list for this research, and Section 2.4 describes an 
overview of the standard attack model.  Section 2.5 presents methods for finding 
information on a system.  Section 2.6 describes techniques for harvesting data from 
applications.  Section 2.7 presents several means of exfiltrating information from 
compromised systems, and Section 2.8 presents a summary of the chapter. 
2.2 Profiling  
 Considerable research for modeling user behavior has been done.  These models 
are based on various inputs such as server access logs, caches from applications, and 
browsing histories.  Profiling users is a difficult task.  A user has the ability to maintain 
multiple priorities and work flows simultaneously, which can change at any moment.  
Several research efforts have had success in identifying and predicting a user’s 
preferences and actions.  Applications for user profiling ranges from tailoring advertising 
campaigns and personalizing shopping experiences to detecting rogue users and 
malicious activity [RBC07].  
2.2.1 Profiling Overview  
In order to analyze a flow of information, user profiling methods predefine 
actions, such as browsing to a web page, creating a file, or requesting resources.  These 
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definitions vary based on the user profiling methodology.  The analysis of actions are 
incorporated into a profile of the users and accumulating more actions increases the 
profiles accuracy. 
Three methods for accomplishing this are presented in order to give a broad 
overview of current methodologies.  These three methods present varying methods of 
predefining information for profiling.   
2.2.2 User Profiling Methods 
2.2.2.1 Activity Ontology 
The first method purports that the modeling of an individual user’s behavior is 
performed by recording and analyzing their activities in a browser [Rob10].  This 
information allows for the tracking of a user no matter where they are on a network via 
their online behavior.  Accomplishing this happens in two phases.  The first phase 
includes the construction of what Dr. Robinson refers to as an “activity ontology” to 
describe in tree form the performance of any particular activity.  An activity ontology 
contains top level nodes representing a breadth of topics from games and sports to world 
and religion.  The top level nodes contain subcategory layers describing the breadth of 
the topic.  Each of these nodes contains associations which relate that node to other 
activities in the ontology as well as a “see also” category, containing human edited 
relationships to other nodes.  In the second phase, collection of data from the user in the 
form of both online and offline data occurs.  The composition of online data is URLs, 
search terms, and page content, while offline data contains bookmarks, cookies, history, 
and text-based files.  The performance of the following six step iterative process on the 
data generates behavioral profiles. 
! 8!
 
1. Identify meaningful attributes.  This involves identifying attributes which describe 
a particular group or an individual.  These attributes can vary widely and can 
include occupation, hobbies, and interests.   
2. Search activity ontology categories.  Using the attributes discovered in Step 1, the 
activity ontology is queried to determine which activities are associated with what 
attribute that describe an individual or group. 
3. Search activity ontology descriptions.  Activity descriptions provide associations 
to other activities in the ontology.  These relate to the attributes identified in Step 
1 and the activities discovered in Step 2.  In this manner, less obvious activities 
associated with the attributes are discovered. 
4. Identify pertinent “See also” categories.  Human identified “See also” categories 
aid in discovering related categories that may not be intuitive, but are contextually 
related.  Steps 2 through 4 require manual consideration for choosing appropriate 
activities. 
5. Instantiate profile.  With the activities chosen, a representative user is chosen that 
meets the profile activities identified in the previous steps. 
6. Refine.  The profile generated from the previous steps may provide results that are 
too narrow or too broad for the purposes required.  This step involves analysis of 
the generated profile in order to modify the profile until it sufficiently describes 
the individual or group.  
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 Once this behavioral fingerprint has been identified, it can be searched for in a 
constantly changing network in which the user could be connecting via hotspots, using 
different workstations, or using mobile network connections [Rob10].  
2.2.2.2 Sequence Modeling 
The sequence modeling profiling method relies on the theory that “sequences play 
a crucial role in human skill learning and reasoning”.  An approach called Evolving 
Agent Behavior Classification based on Distributions of relevant events (EvABCD) 
concentrates on modeling sequences as a behavioral profile of a user [IAL09].  This 
research considers user behavior to be sequences of UNIX commands issued to a 
computer via a command–line interface.  EvABCD has two goals: 
 
1. Creating and updating user profiles from the commands the users type in a 
UNIX shell. 
2. Classifying a new sequence of commands into the pre-defined profiles. 
 
With this behavioral profile the researchers are able to use an evolving system 
approach to continuously update a user’s profile.  The system evolves by considering past 
sequences entered by the user as well as adding in new sequences.  A library containing 
different expected behaviors is created and evolves, influenced by changing user 
behavior.  This adaptive method utilizes an incremental learning algorithm and can be 
used to detect abnormalities in user behavior for purposes of detecting masqueraders 
[IAL09].   
! 10!
2.2.2.3 Job History 
Yet another method creates user profiles by monitoring the job history of each 
user that accesses a system [OBB06].  Jobs are requests for processing by a user on a 
computer center.  User models are generated from information obtained during system 
use by using an evolutionary algorithm that evolves a few generations after each job is 
completed.  The system measures requested resources against actual used resources for a 
job and utilizes these results as benchmarks.  A job queue holds all of the jobs sent by the 
user while the evolutionary algorithm predicts the actual resources needed to complete all 
the jobs.  Once the system has monitored many interactions, the models are better 
adapted for the particular user, which allows for the scheduler to be more efficient.  The 
user model can be used in place of the requested resources from the user and also to 
monitor when the usage of that system by the user has changed. 
2.2.3 Information Profiles 
 The techniques discussed in Section 2.2.2 provide an overview of how user 
profiles can be generated to describe ever-changing interactions between users and 
computers.  These three methods attempt to build a profile of the user via their past and 
present activity in order to determine any deviation from it.  This research is concerned 
with pre-defining information in order to identify it when it is present in communication.  
User profiling typically contains methods for pre-defining information for identification 
purposes.  It is conceivable that these techniques can be adapted to profile information 
being sought.   
For this research, profiles are a list of words that describe a particular topic. 
Figure!2.1 shows excerpts from two profiles used in this research.  The left profile is a 
! 11!
random profile and the right profile is a meaningful profile.  Some of the methods 
described in this section can be used to generate profiles.  For this research profiles are 
generated by two methods: 1) random selection from a wordlist and 2) utilizing a 
dictionary website with a search word to generate meaningful profiles.  A meaningful 
profile is a list of words that have a semantic relationship to the chosen topic. 
! !
goforit 
john316 
sleepy 
claude 
iloveyou2 
africa 
basil 
number9 
overkill 
james1 
columbia 
randy1 
freedom 
fireball 
scorpio 
gray 
good 
dusty 
3010 
beanie 
micro 
dylan 
beaches 
power 
alicia 
monty 
account 
activity 
advertising 
affair 
affairs 
agency 
bank 
banking 
brokerage 
business 
byplay 
carrier 
clientele 
commerce 
commercial 
company 
competition 
concern 
construction 
corp 
corporation 
custom 
deal 
enterprise 
establishment 
firm 
 
Figure 2.1: Random and Meaningful Profile Excerpts 
!
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2.3 Network Attack Priority List 
 A network priority list is an ordered list of systems. The order is determined by 
the system with the most matches to the profile; the rest of the systems are listed in 
descending order.  Network attack priority listings are useful when looking for specific 
information on a network.  A profile defines the information the attacker seeks.  For 
example, Figure!2.2 presents a sample network attack priority listing with the name, 
number of matches, and identifying information for each system.  The attacker attacks 
Victim5 first, followed by Victim4, then each subsequent system on the list.  This 
continues until either the information is found, or all systems have been attacked.  This 
list guides the attacker and alleviates the need to guess which system contains the 
information being sought.   
 
!
Figure 2.2: Network Attack Priority List 
!
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2.4 Attack Model 
 In the typical advanced attack scenario, an attacker must gain access to a network 
via some front-facing node accessible from the Internet [SkL06].  In order to infiltrate the 
network the attacker needs to avoid alerting the network defenders to an ongoing attack.  
Network defenders are considered to be any human, system, or application that is present 
on the network that can perform defensive actions when an unauthorized access attempt 
is made.   
2.4.1 Attack Phases 
The attacker accomplishes network infiltration by following a standard attack 
model consisting of five phases [TuS03].  These five phases are shown in Table!2.1, 
including steps that are included in each of the phases. 
Once the attacker has a target in mind, phase one is to discover as much 
information about the entity that controls that target as they possibly can, gathering lists 
of systems accessible to the attacker.  Phase two is to perform network scans on these 
targets to identify vulnerabilities that can be exploited to gain a foothold on the network.  
Phase three exploits the vulnerabilities discovered to gain access to the perimeter 
systems, which typically include any system that requires access to the Internet including 
systems such as the DNS name servers, web servers, or any system that provides an 
interaction between the Internet and intranet of an entity.  Once access is gained to the 
network, phase four is to maintain access to that system by installing some sort of 
persistent application that will allow the attacker to gain access to the system at any point 
in the future.  Once the first four phases have been accomplished the attacker wants to 
ensure that they have left the smallest possible detectable presence on the exploited 
! 14!
machine.  In phase five the attacker cleans up any system access logs and hides any tools 
that are left on the system for maintaining access.  Hiding the tools in place on the system 
and maintaining access is often accomplished by implanting a rootkit on the system 
[SkL06].  After the completion of this attack model, the attacker has a pivot point, which 
allows the attacker to use that system to attack other systems residing on the internal 
network.   
 
Table 2.1: Anatomy of an Attack [TuS03] 
Phase # Phase Name Objective Technique 
1 
Footprint Target address range and 
naming acquisition and 
information gathering are 
essential to a “surgical” attack; 
The key here is not to miss any 
details. 
Search engines,  
WHOIS database, 
Web interface to WHOIS, 
DNS zone transfer 
2 
Scanning  Target address range, naming 
acquisition and information 
gathering are essential to a 
surgical attack.  It is very 
important not to miss any 
details. 
Ping sweep, 
Port scan 
Enumeration Bulk target assessment and 
identification of listening 
services focusing on the most 
promising avenues of entry. 
List user accounts, 
List file shares, 
Identify applications 
3 
Gaining Access Enough data has been gathered 
at this point to make an 
informed attempt to access the 
target. 
Password eavesdropping, 
File share brute forcing, 
Password file grabbing, 
Buffer overflows. 
Escalating Privilege If only user level access was 
gained in the last step, the 
attacker will now seek to gain 
complete control of the 
system. 
Password cracking, 
Known exploits 
4 
Acquisition The information-gathering 
process begins again to 
identify mechanisms to gain 
access to trusted systems. 
Evaluate trusts, 
Search for passwords 
5 
Cover Tracks Once total ownership of the 
target is secured, hiding this 
fact from the system 
administrators becomes 
paramount. 
Clearing log files, 
Hiding tools. 
Back Doors Trapdoors will be laid in 
various parts of the system to 
ensure that privileged access is 
easily regained at the whim of 
the intruder 
Create rogue user accounts, 
Schedule batch jobs, Infect 
startup files, plant remote 
control services, install 
monitoring mechanisms, 
replace apps with trojans 
!
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2.4.2 Enterprise Network 
! Once access to the network is achieved the attacker can now begin the process of 
locating targets, which can be a daunting task.  The United States Air Force (USAF) 
network contains over a half a million desktops and servers across the world [Lan07].  
Enterprise level networks on this scale can be difficult to manage, which has prompted 
these types of larger enterprise networks to adopt solutions such as the Standard 
Desktop/Server Configuration (SDC).  The SDC is a single image that is vetted and 
deployed throughout the entire USAF network with common software pre-installed such 
as an antivirus product, Microsoft Office suite and Adobe Acrobat Reader [Lop06].  This 
approach has many implications for both the attacker attempting to locate target 
information across the network and the ability of the network defense team to prevent 
them.  !
2.4.2.1 SDC Attacker Advantages 
The SDC provides advantages and disadvantages for both the attacker and the 
defender.  Information about the target network is extremely valuable to attackers and the 
most innocuous release of data can be aggregated with other harmless data.  While these 
pieces of information alone might have been harmless, together they can provide 
attackers with key information needed to penetrate a secure network.  With the SDC an 
attacker can download the image, explore, and identify potential vulnerabilities that can 
be exploited to gain access to the system.  This has the potential of saving the attacker 
many hours and giving them a focused plan of attack for penetrating the entire network 
[MSK09].   
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2.4.2.2 SDC Defender Advantages 
Despite these dangers, by using the SDC the defenders also save many hours and 
make attacks much more difficult to execute.  The SDC images are more secure as a 
result of only allowing approved commercial software to be present on the system, 
lowering the privilege level of the average user, and developing the image to secure 
standards set by various agencies in the security industry including the Department of 
Defense, National Security Agency, Microsoft, etc. [Lan07].   
2.4.2.3 SDC Potential Vulnerability 
While this increased security makes it more difficult for the attacker to find and 
exploit a vulnerability, the entire network becomes more susceptible to zero day exploits 
that affect software installed on the SDC.  Since the configuration is standard throughout 
a large network, a zero day exploit effective against the SDC can have catastrophic 
effects, allowing malware to quickly spread throughout the network.  
2.5 Finding the Data 
 Now that the attacker has access to resources on the network, the goal becomes 
finding the target information.  This must be done without alerting the network defenders 
to the presence of an attacker on the network.  There are two types of methods that are 
available: active methods and passive methods.  An attacker is not restricted to using one 
method or the other, and they will often use a combination of both.  Within a network, 
data is represented as either data-at-rest or data-in-transit.  These two types of 
representation require different methods of interception and retrieval.  The following 
sections delineate active and passive methods of finding targeted data-in-motion and 
data-in-transit. 
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2.5.1 Definition of Active Method and Passive Method 
 Before looking at the methods used to target data, it is necessary to define exactly 
what is meant by an active method and a passive method.  Active methods for finding 
data include any method that uses stimuli to cause the system to respond in a manner that 
allows the attacker to gain knowledge of the information contained in or passing through 
the system.  Conversely, passive methods are methods that only observe the flow of data 
in a system and gain knowledge of information the system contains without applying 
stimuli to the system that contains it.   
2.5.1.1 Active and Passive Network Fingerprinting 
Fingerprinting a network with either active or passive methods can be achieved in 
a similar manner. Figure!2.3 graphically demonstrates the differences between actively 
and passively fingerprinting a network.  When attempting to map a network, a passive 
network scan can be just as effective as an active network scan with the added benefit of 
being almost completely invisible to the network administrators [Bar10].  Both active and 
passive scans can identify open ports and services, map connections and identify 
operating systems of nodes on the network.  However, the increased amount of time 
required to complete a passive scan is a factor when deciding which scan to use.  
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!
Figure 2.3: Active and Passive Fingerprinting [Bar10] 
!
2.5.1.2 Discovering System Data 
There are active and passive methods that can be utilized when attempting to 
discover data that resides in or passes through a system.  The major difference between 
passive methods of searching data and passive fingerprinting of the network is that the 
passive data targeting technique requires the attacker to first establish a presence on each 
system before he can begin monitoring what data flows through that system.  These 
definitions are used in the following sections to categorize the techniques used by 
attacker to find and exfiltrated data from target networks. 
2.5.2 Data-at-Rest 
 Data-at-rest refers to data that is stored on the computer or an attached storage 
device [Ide10].  Data can be stored in many different containers including databases, 
email systems, file shares, and storage area networks [Sha07].  The data stored in these 
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containers can be in many different file formats, ranging from text files to configuration 
files, as well as a large number of proprietary file types.   
2.5.2.1 Active Methods 
Active methods of finding data-at-rest often involve the attacker actively 
searching for the data via a remote terminal.  Methods for accomplishing this task include 
the standard built-in search utilities on the operating system and using domain tools such 
as DameWare [Dam12].  
 Most operating systems have a built-in search utility for finding files and folders.  
The Windows 7 search feature is designed to index external hard drives, networked PC’s, 
libraries, as well as the files on the system itself [Win11].  The operating system uses a 
program called the Windows Search Service to analyze a document and index 
information such as the file contents, filename, and file options [Pro11].  While this index 
does not contain every file, it does index many of the most common file types that the 
user would commonly search for.  An attacker can utilize this index just like any other 
user on the system via batch scripts designed to search on the command line or manually 
accessing the search features built into the operating system.  Attackers can also make 
use of other tool sets such as WinSCP [Win12], FAR Manager [Far12], and various other 
file managers to provide limited scripting and easily available capabilities while 
accessing a system remotely. 
 The domain controller is often a primary target for an attacker looking for 
information and control of a network.  The domain controller contains information about 
users on every system attached to the domain it controls as well as authenticating users to 
domain resources [Sea00].  Windows domain controllers have a program that is used to 
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manage their domain called the Microsoft Management Console (MMC).  However, for 
an attacker this may not contain all the functionality needed to search the network for the 
target data.  Tools such as DameWare can be installed on the domain controller by the 
attacker to extend the functionality of the MMC by adding collections of Microsoft 
administration tools, a remote control program, and powerful export functionality 
[Ntu11].  With these additional tools and access to the domain controller, the attacker is 
free to search remotely throughout the entire domain for the target information.    
2.5.2.2 Passive Methods 
Passive methods for accessing data-at-rest include infecting a system, which 
either contains the target data, or has access to the target data, with malware.  Keyloggers 
are programs that can be inserted into different areas of the system to log keystrokes that 
the user enters into the system [HoB06].  Modern keyloggers can also contain the ability 
to take screen captures of the target system during use to both capture information which 
is not typed in as well as information entered in via other methods of input [PeI09].  Once 
the attacker is able to insert the keylogger into the system, the attacker need only wait for 
the user to access the desired information.  Then it is just a matter of the attacker 
impersonating that user and logging into whatever storage media the data is contained in 
with the stolen credentials of the user [GBC06].   
Other passive means of monitoring what the user accesses on the system falls 
under a custom Trojan category.  Trojan malware hijacks legitimate applications in order 
to trick the user into allowing access to systems.  These custom Trojans can be 
specifically tailored to the applications that deal with the data being targeted by the 
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attacker.  These Trojans lie dormant in the system, waiting for a specific application or 
file to be launched allowing the attacker access to information on the system. 
2.5.3 Data-in-Transit 
 Data-in-transit can be viewed in several different ways, data moving across 
untrusted networks such as the Internet and data in transit within an intranet.  In addition 
to this, data-in-transit refers to data that is being processed by the system [Sha07].  Data 
moving across the Internet is not of interest to this research because this research focuses 
on activities within the local area networks.  In this paper, data that is moving across the 
intranet and data being processed by the system are both considered to be data-in-transit.  
This type of data targeting and retrieval can be much more difficult than targeting data-at-
rest.   
2.5.3.1 Active Methods 
Active methods for targeting data-in-transit are some of the most advanced pieces 
of malware that are currently in use.  The design of these specimens requires extensive 
knowledge of the inner workings and organization of the targeted data, the applications 
used to encrypt and send the data as well as the operating system that interacts with both.  
While there are more than just the techniques listed below, the following list represents 
some of the more dangerous methods attackers can use to intercept data-in-transit: 
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• Pervasive memory scraping 
• Memory parsing malware 
• Network injection 
• Web form modification 
 
 Pervasive memory scraping is one of the most dangerous attack techniques of 
2011 according to the SANS institute as well as several other top security threat lists 
[Mes11].  Many organizations have employed encryption techniques throughout their 
network to protect data using technologies such as VPNs, SSL, and full disk encryption.  
These protections protect the data when they are properly employed, but the system must 
still unencrypt the information in order to be able to process the data [Mil11].  Since the 
Windows operating system does not always immediately overwrite the memory segments 
used, the memory scraping malware is able to obtain data that still exists in volatile 
memory even after the program that was processing that data has terminated [Hel11]. 
 A similar type of active data gathering technique uses malware present on the 
system to find and dump the memory of applications that are associated with the data that 
the attacker is searching for.  Once this application is identified, the malware dumps the 
address space associated with that process.  A custom memory parsing application can 
then be employed to dissect the memory dump looking for the target data.  This process 
can be repeated as often as necessary for the malware to intercept the data that is being 
processed by the targeted application [PSI10].  Attackers can also install debugging tools 
on the targeted system.  This gives them another avenue for both dumping memory 
spaces to disk and also parsing volatile memory during runtime [Vis08].  Stealthier 
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versions of memory parsing malware inject a memory-parsing module directly into the 
target process.  This eliminates the need for a second process to be running on the system 
making it more difficult for someone to notice the rogue process.  The module can be 
injected into the process’ address space, allowing the malware to search for the target 
data [VSP10]. 
 An attacker can perform network injection attacks by performing an ARP cache 
poisoning attack.  This technique allows an attacker to remap MAC-IP associations on a 
network to send packets to the attackers system instead of the intended system such as the 
gateway.  The attacker can then view traffic that was not intended for his system [SkL06] 
before forwarding it on to the destination without the sender ever knowing the traffic was 
intercepted.  The first benefit to the attacker is that this will allow him to monitor all 
unencrypted traffic between the client device and any device with which it is trying to 
communicate.  Additional benefits include the ability to modify the data in transit, which 
allows the attacker to perform a technique called session hijacking or session injection.  
In a Trustwave penetration test an expert was able to inject their own commands into an 
existing SQL session between the client and a SQL database [PIM11].  This allowed the 
attacker the ability to perform tasks such as creating administrative accounts allowing 
access to the entire database. 
 An alternate method for gathering data is targeting it at the source.  Many 
corporations, businesses, and other entities utilize a web interface for data entry into 
databases and various other storage methods.  Attackers are able to utilize advanced SQL 
attacks in order to obtain system-level access to the web interface.  With this level of 
access the attacker is able to modify the contents of the web page to allow for the 
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harvesting of data that is submitted to it [PIM11].  By intercepting the information before 
it is encrypted and stored, an attacker can receive valuable information without having to 
break strong data protection schemes by effectively bypassing encryption. 
2.5.3.2 Passive Methods 
Passive methods for gathering data typically have a much smaller digital footprint 
on a system once that system has been infiltrated.  Since the malware is waiting and 
watching the data flow without actually affecting it, malware using passive methods can 
be very difficult to discover.  Two methods of passive data gathering are a kernel-level 
variation of the memory parsing malware discussed above and network traffic sniffers.   
 The passive version of memory parsing malware operates a bit different than what 
is described above.  Instead of dumping the memory address space of the targeted 
process, the malware attacks the kernel of the operating system.  A kernel-level driver is 
inserted into the system, which allows the malware to intercept particular system function 
calls in order to intercept data that is being written to, and read from, the file system.  
With this access the attacker can search for the target data each time the system either 
reads from or writes to a file [VSP10].  
 Sniffing of network traffic is an extremely effective way of discovering sensitive 
information on both a network and an individual system.  An attacker that is able to 
install a network sniffer on a network and perform an ARP cache poisoning attack will 
have access to all unencrypted traffic traversing the network.  Tools such as Dsniff 
[Dsn12], Ettercap [Ett12], and Wireshark [Wir12] can be used to listen to protocols on 
the network and harvest credentials and target information that is traversing the network 
[SkL06].   
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Attackers can perform sniffing on the system with keyloggers that are able to 
intercept the keystrokes entered by the user as they enter data into the system.  This 
information can be used to view user credentials or even be aggregated and parsed in 
order to find the target data being entered by the user [PIM11].   
2.6 Harvesting the Data 
 Once the target data has been located on the system or the network using one of 
the techniques above, the next task is to harvest that data in preparation for exfiltration 
back to the attacker or a command and control server.  Which methods are used by the 
attacker are directly impacted by where the target data is located, what is required to 
extract the data from memory, and how the data is to be exfiltrated from the target system 
to the attacker C2 server.   
 Attackers that utilize one of the memory-parsing malware family techniques can 
extract the information in several different ways.  The attacker can dump the target 
memory to the disk and then execute a custom parser to look for the target data in the 
dump.  This method has the drawback of using a separate executable to perform each 
task, which increases the footprint on the target system [PSI10] as well as creating 
possibly large dump files on the infiltrated computer’s hard drive.  Other types of 
targeted malware attacks create their own file on the target system and append any newly 
found information to the end of the file [VSP10].  Alternatively, some malware never 
writes any information to disk, instead only keeping the output in volatile memory 
[PIM11].    
! 26!
 2.7 Data Exfiltration Preparation 
 Persistent attacks often use a file on disk to hold the information the malware is 
aggregating for the attacker.  The attacker has a vested interest in preventing that file 
from being found prior to the attacker retrieving the information.  There are a variety of 
methods that the attacker can use to make the file unnoticeable, or even if it is found, 
unreadable.  While the attackers may leave the file as an ASCII text file it is much more 
likely that the attacker will attempt some sort of obfuscation technique to hide their 
output file [PSI10].  This is accomplished by using various techniques such as encoding, 
encryption, and steganography. 
Encoding is a bitwise operation performing an exclusive or (XOR) between each 
bit of each character and a secret key, resulting in a “0” or a “1”.  This operation is run 
for every bit in the data file resulting in an obfuscated file.  This file can only be returned 
to human readable language by performing the reverse operation with the key [Hus11].  
As an anti-forensic capability some malware authors include an encryption algorithm and 
key with the malware.  The malware then encrypts any information written to the output 
file with the key, requiring anyone wanting to analyze that file to know both the 
algorithm and key in order to read it [PSI10].   
Another more involved method of data hiding is known as steganography.  This is 
the “practice of hiding a message within a larger one in such a way that others cannot 
discern the presence or contents of the hidden message” [Wes10].  In standard practice 
this involves hiding data inside a multimedia format such as a picture or music file.  This 
is accomplished by replacing strategic bits of the host file with bits of the data to be 
hidden [SkL06].  These methods, among others, help the attacker to hide the data on the 
! 27!
system while waiting for exfiltration as well as making it easier to bypass perimeter 
security devices when the actual data exfiltration occurs.  This stealthy method comes at 
a hefty performance price in terms of real data throughput. 
While the previous techniques make it difficult for users and automated systems 
to understand the contents of the attacker’s output file, the mere fact of a file’s existence 
increases the chances of someone noticing the penetration of the system.  Often attackers 
turn to file hiding to keep anyone from noticing that the file exists on the system.  By 
default Windows Explorer does not show files that contain the System and Hidden file 
attributes.  By adding these attributes to the output file, the file itself will not be shown to 
the user if they have not changed the default options for folders [VSP10].  This does not 
protect the file from being scanned by automated systems but it will prevent a large 
percentage of users from noticing the file.  The location of the output file in the file 
directory can also aid in preventing users from noticing additional files added by the 
attacker.  While there are no restrictions to where the malware could hide the output file, 
a couple of the most common file paths are:  
 
• C:\Windows\system32 
• C:\Temp 
• C:\Documents and Settings\profilename\Local Settings\Temp [Hus11] 
 
These folders often contain many file types, folders, and executables that are 
unfamiliar to the average user, making it difficult for them to spot files that should not be 
there.  To further confuse the user, the output file can be changed to an unassociated file 
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type.  Since no application has been registered to open that file, anyone attempting to 
view the contents will be met with an unknown file type error.  Since most files in the 
system32 folder have the date of the system install, adding a new file to that folder will 
often stand out from the other files.  A method known as time stomping involves 
changing various fields in the $STANDARD_INFORMATION Attribute in order to 
modify the creation and modification date shown by Windows Explorer [LAH11].  
Malware authors will often mix and match many of these previously discussed techniques 
to both prevent users from discovering their output files and prevent forensic analysts 
from discovering the data that was exfiltrated from their networks after the breach has 
been discovered.  The final preparation step of the attacker is often to compress the data 
that is ready to be exfiltrated thereby reducing the amount of traffic that will be leaving 
the network.  The target data is now ready to be exfiltrated back to the attacker. 
 At this point the attacker has found the information he sought, extracted it from 
wherever it resided, written that output to disk, and prevented anyone from finding that 
output.  The last remaining task is to retrieve the target data.  Often systems such as web 
proxies and firewall rules exist at the perimeter of networks in order to control the types 
of ingress and egress traffic allowed [Coy11].  However there are many ways into and out 
of a network and it is impossible to secure them all without impeding the legitimate flow 
of information [GBC06].  The attacker has nearly accomplished his goal and maintaining 
stealth is still of paramount importance.  
 
!
!
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2.7.1 Native Protocols 
While some malware comes equipped with it’s own exfiltration technique, Figure!
2.4 shows that the majority of malware uses existing protocols and applications already 
present on the target system [PIM11].       
 
 
Figure 2.4: Data Export Functionality [PIM11] 
!
There are several applications that exist natively on the Windows operating 
system that can be used to export data off the system.  Some of the protocols that these 
applications use are the following: 
 
• HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol) 
• FTP (File Transfer Protocol) 
• SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) 
 
! 30!
Most networks carry a significant amount of Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) 
traffic, making it easier to hide malicious HTTP traffic.  It takes a significant amount of 
processing power to analyze every packet traversing a corporate network, and almost 
every network allows outbound HTTP traffic [PIM11].  This is also where the data 
exfiltration preparation has some added benefits.  By utilizing one of techniques 
discussed above it is a difficult task, or even impossible when dealing with encryption, to 
analyze the traffic that is egressing the network [Gho10] in real-time.  In addition many 
networks do not incorporate Secure Socket Layer (SSL) monitoring so attackers can 
easily use Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) in order to provide built in end-
to-end encryption to export their captured data [PIM11].  SSL monitoring works by 
having a web proxy for SSL communication which hosts a certificate installed on 
network systems.  When a workstation attempts to make an HTTPS connection with a 
web server the connection is first made to the proxy, which can analyze the traffic.  The 
web proxy will then make a connection to the destination server for legitimate traffic and 
alert on bad traffic.  This allows the web proxy to act as an authorized man-in-the-middle. 
FTP is a protocol still in use on many networks, is included in the Microsoft 
Windows operating system [Per10], and is easy to set up and use to transfer files.  These 
characteristics make it an extremely attractive option for exfiltrating data off the system.   
SMTP (Simple Mail Transfer Protocol) is another application often used by 
attackers to export data [PIM11].  Attackers can either install their own malicious SMTP 
server or activate the application already installed on Windows operating systems.  This 
allows the attackers to simply email the extracted data to the address of their choosing.  
While there are many additional ways that attackers can exfiltrate data out of a network, 
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including custom applications, variations on the above applications, and many covert 
channel techniques, these are often not necessary. 
2.8 Summary 
 This chapter presents overviews and background information on topics related to 
user profiling, standard attack methodology, active and passive methods for finding 
information on a system, and exfiltrating data from a network.  Attackers are always 
attempting to find new methods for maintaining access without alerting network 
defenders to their presence while exfiltrating data out of the network.   
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter describes the implementation of MAPS and the various support tools 
used for validation.  From an attacker’s perspective, performing reconnaissance on 
networks is a time consuming and labor intensive operation.  Using profiles and 
automation finding target information on larger networks becomes less difficult.  This 
limits the amount of human interaction with the target network, reducing the chances of 
detection by network defenders.  
3.1.1 Research Motivation 
 Attackers are often interested in what users discuss electronically via chat and 
email.  This information can be stored on workstations and servers across the network.  
As the reliance of organizations upon their computer network increases so does the need 
for the attackers to be able to effectively and easily perform reconnaissance upon those 
networks.  According to the National Public Radio, the U.S. government recognizes that 
it needs between twenty and thirty thousand computer security specialists in order to both 
perform operations and defend its networks [Gje10].  Only an estimated one thousand 
with the required skills currently exist.  Motivation for creating tools such as MAPS is the 
usage of computer security attack experts in a more appropriate manner, allowing tasks 
that cannot be automated to be assigned to humans. 
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3.1.2 Chapter Overview 
 Section 3.2 considers various approaches to accomplishing the research goal. An 
overview of the implementation is then discussed in Section 3.3, which includes a 
description of the development environments, tool development decisions, and design 
decisions.  Section 3.4 describes the test environment and the experimental setup in 
detail, and finally, the summary of the chapter is given in Section 3.5. 
3.2 Design Constraints 
 There are many approaches that can be leveraged to accomplish the goal of 
determining a ranking of computer systems on a network.  This ranking is referred to in 
this research as a network attack priority list that can be used by attackers to determine 
the preferred order for finding target information.  This research considers the following 
subset of approaches to be viable options for accomplishing the stated goal: 
 
• Web traffic:  Web traffic can provide detailed information about the system’s 
users.  However, much more information must be known about each site visited 
in order to glean any useful information that can be compared to a predefined 
profile. 
• System input logging:  The monitoring of input from a user on a system can 
provide a picture of actions a user performs on a system.  However, this type of 
data gathering would result in a large amount of data that would require 
complicated monitoring and correlation of input and system access logs to 
determine user actions. 
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• Email traffic:  This type of traffic is mostly text based and can be easily parsed 
while providing insight into the system user’s communication with other users.  
In addition, email is a prevalent choice for coordinating group activities.  This 
approach is chosen for the proof of concept. 
 
While many approaches can provide a similar proof of concept, the availability of 
an email corpus provided a readily available source of input to properly demonstrate the 
utility of MAPS.   
3.3 MAPS Design 
 This section discusses the implementation of the research tool design known as  
MAPS, as well as the applications used to support MAPS.  This tool intercepts emails 
from the user in order to determine if the word appears in a profile generated by the 
attacker.  Startmaps.exe is placed on the system by the exploitation of a notional 
vulnerability setting up the folder structure required by MAPS.  Once the folders are 
created, startmaps.exe performs a Domain Name System (DNS) query to obtain the 
Internet Protocol (IP) address of the C2 server and downloads the most recent version of 
MAPS and the profile.  These files are placed in the pre-designated locations in the 
previously created folder structure.   
MAPS is then launched without any windows visible to the user, reading in the 
profile and waiting for any write operations to occur on the email output file.  When a 
write occurs, MAPS reads the contents of the file, stores the contents in a buffer, and 
parses the text.  The body of the email is compared to the profile, looking for any 
matches.  If no matches are found, then nothing is recorded and MAPS returns to 
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monitoring the file for another message to parse.  If matches are found, MAPS records 
the sender’s email address and a list of the matched profile words.  Collection of the to: 
field is useful to build associations of users concerned with the topics of interest.  These 
results are recorded in a results file, and MAPS waits for another message to parse.   
MAPS asynchronously communicates with the C2 server according to a timer that 
is configured at compile time by the attacker.  When the timer expires, MAPS sends the 
file containing the matches to the C2 server.  MAPS also collects several identifying 
characteristics of each system it is executing on, including the Media Access Control 
(MAC) address, IP address assigned by the network Dynamic Host Control Protocol, and 
the system username.  The C2 server parses the message from each MAPS client storing 
the unique identifying information pertaining to each system in a database.   
The attacker is able to analyze the information from a number of clients to build a 
network attack priority list based upon the matches found.  A network attack priority list 
is an ordered list of systems.  The order is determined by the system with the most 
matches to the profile; the rest of the systems are listed in descending order.  An attacker 
then uses the list when searching for target data on a network. 
3.3.1 Development Environments 
This research uses three development environments to develop the tools and 
scripts employed: 
 
• MAPS client development environment 
• MAPS server development 
• Script development environment 
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The development system for MAPS client is a machine containing 2 Intel Xeon 
R2400 quad core processors, 24GB of RAM, 500GB of hard drive space, and running 
Windows 7 64-bit Enterprise SP1 operating system with the latest updates (at the time of 
development).  The development of MAPS requires the use of a windows compiler; 
Visual Studio 2010 is used for this purpose. 
 The second build system is a Virtual Machine (VM) running 1 processor, 8GB of 
RAM, 20GB of hard drive space, and BackTrack 5 distribution of the Linux operating 
system.  This VM is running on the physical system describe above.  The VM setting are 
chosen as basic settings and have very little impact on the development process.  Two 
utilities are added to the standard BackTrack 5 install: 
 
• Gcc: gcc is the GNU compiler used to compile GNU/Linux executables 
• Gdb: gdb is a GNU debugger used to dynamically find and fix programming 
errors and bugs in the program 
 
The final development environment setup is a system running a 2.53GHz Intel 
Core i5 processor with 4 cores, 4GB of RAM, 500GB of hard drive space, and Mac OS X 
version 10.7.4.  Only Ruby version 1.9.3 is added to the system in order to begin 
development of the scripts. 
3.3.2 Tool Development  
3.3.2.1 MAPS Client 
The client portion of MAPS is developed as a 32-bit application targeted to 
execute on the Windows 7 operating system.  While there are myriad operating systems 
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that workstations can potentially employ, as of September 2011 the Windows operating 
system had a market share of over 86 percent [Net12].  Therefore, it is reasonable to 
assume that the majority of workstations are operating a version of the Windows 
operating system.  With this in mind, a 32-bit binary is developed in order to provide the 
greatest cross compatibility between various types of Windows operating systems.  
Windows 7 is the most current version of Windows at the time of this research.  
3.3.2.2. MAPS Server 
The server portion of MAPS is developed as a Linux application designed to run 
on BackTrack 5.  BackTrack 5 is a security-oriented Linux distribution that contains a 
majority of applications pre-installed, decreasing initial setup time and complexity.  The 
presence of a MySQL database setup, python install containing the SimpleHTTPServer 
script, and the majority of the prerequisites for installing the gcc compiler made this a 
convenient option as the C2 server for the attacker. 
3.3.2.3 Programming Languages 
Programming languages utilized throughout development include the C 
programming language as well as the Ruby scripting language.  C is used in the 
development of the MAPS client and server components as well as the helper application.  
C is the primary development language due primarily to the author’s familiarity, as well 
as well-documented Windows API calls allowing for difficult tasks to be performed 
easily.  The Ruby scripting language is used in the two scripts that are associated with the 
email data set.  Ruby’s choice as a scripting language stemmed from its built in string and 
regex handling capabilities.  Since the scripts are only required to run once, the speed of 
the program’s execution is not a factor, allowing for an interpreted language to be used. 
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3.3.3 Design Decisions 
 This section discusses the particular design decisions for this research.  These 
design decisions include: 
 
• MAPS as a multi-threaded application 
• MAPS performs asynchronous communication 
• MAPS communication method 
 
3.3.3.1 Multi-threaded Application 
MAPS has three primary tasks it must perform to accomplish the goal of 
successfully intercepting user email traffic.  First, it must constantly watch for any 
changes to the file containing the output from the Thunderbird modifications.  This file 
contains the content of the user’s email and the address of the user.  Secondly, MAPS 
must analyze a large number of incoming emails simultaneously; finally, MAPS needs to 
be able to contact the C2 server at intervals set by the attacker.  To do this, MAPS makes 
use of the process.h standard C library.  Figure!3.1 illustrates the MAPS process flow 
discussed throughout this section. 
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Figure 3.1: MAPS Process Flow 
 
In order to accomplish the three tasks listed above, the main function, referred to 
as the parent thread, creates two threads.   
 The first thread, referred to as child 1, calls the function waitForFileWrite, which 
expects no arguments and is shown in Figure!3.2. 
 
_beginthread(waitForFileWrite, 0, NULL); 
 Figure 3.2: Begin Child 1 
 
 The waitForFileWrite function utilizes the Windows API call 
FindFirstChangeNotification with three arguments, shown in Figure!3.3.  The path of the 
folder to be watched, a flag indicating if any subfolders within that folder should also be 
monitored, and a filter specifying which change notification satisfies the function.   
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h = FindFirstChangeNotification( wWatchFolder, 0, FILE_NOTIFY_CHANGE_LAST_WRITE ); 
Figure 3.3: Watch Folder Code 
!
 Child 1 tells the operating system to signal when there is any change to the last 
write-time of files within the watched directory [Msd2].  This function causes child 1 to 
wait until such an even occurs.  Upon continuing, child 1 then opens the file and ingests 
the contents into a dynamically allocated buffer called email.  Figure!3.4 shows a new 
thread, child 2 is spawned in order to parse the contents of email.  This new thread begins 
in the function checkFile.  
 
_beginthread(checkFile, 0, (void *)email); 
Figure 3.4: Begin Child 2 
!
checkFile then performs the task of parsing the text of the email and determining if 
any matches occur.  Child 1 returns to waiting for changes to occur in the watch 
directory.  In this manner, the parsing of the emails contents, which can be time 
consuming, does not interfere with the MAPS function of waiting for emails to be written 
to the output file. 
 Figure!3.5 shows the parent thread creating the second thread, referred to as child 
3.  Child 3 calls the function callC2, which is expecting no arguments. 
 
handle = (HANDLE) _beginthread(callC2, 0, NULL); 
Figure 3.5: Begin Child 3 
!
 This thread call is executed repeatedly within a while loop throughout the 
execution of MAPS.  The loop employs a sleep timer that causes the parent thread to 
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sleep for a time period specified by the attacker during compilation.  This timer is defined 
in the source code shown in Figure!3.6. 
 
#define C2_INTERVAL 300000 //phone home interval - 1000/second 
Figure 3.6: C2 Contact Timer 
!
This interval causes the parent thread to sleep for 300 seconds before spawning 
the child 2 thread again. 
 
   while(1) 
   { 
    Sleep(C2_INTERVAL); 
    handle = (HANDLE) _beginthread(callC2, 0, NULL);  
    WaitForSingleObject(handle,INFINITE); 
   } 
 
Figure 3.7: C2 Send Results Loop 
 
The WaitForSingleObject API call, shown in Figure!3.7, takes in the handle to the 
thread being called and causes the parent thread to wait indefinitely,  or until child 2 
finishes executing.  callC2 performs the task of reading the matches from results.txt, 
contacting the C2 server, and sending the match information. !
3.3.3.2 Asynchronous Communication 
The asynchronous communication used in MAPS allows the attacker to control 
two things.  First, the attacker can control when the matches are communicated back to 
the C2 server.  If the attacker has knowledge of the target network, the attacker is able to 
customize the time of day communication occurs with the C2 server.  The attacker can 
either hide during busy network traffic times or communicate when network defenders 
will not notice.  The second benefit of this asynchronous communication method is the 
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ability of the attacker to configure MAPS network noise level based upon the need to 
remain unnoticed on the network.  Exfiltrating the data with longer intervals makes 
MAPS less likely to be noticed by a network defense team.  Overall, sending 
transmissions on a modifiable timer back to the C2 server allows the attacker to configure 
the tool for the target network. 
3.3.3.3 C2 Communication Method 
When the C2_INTERVAL expires, MAPS enters the callC2 function in order to set up 
a communication link with the C2 server.  Once inside this function, MAPS determines if 
any matches have been recorded, shown in Figure!3.8.  If results.txt contains no matches, 
then the function exits and waits for the C2_INTERVAL to expire.  This prevents extraneous 
communication from occurring that could be detected by the network defenders.   
 
   pFile = fopen ( resultPath , "rb" ); //open the result.txt file 
   if (pFile==NULL)  
    _endthread(); //if the file fails to open, exit thread 
  
   fseek (pFile , 0 , SEEK_END); //set position indicator to end of file  
   lSize = ftell (pFile); //get value of position indicator; gives file size 
   rewind (pFile); //set position indicator to beginning of file 
 
   fclose(pFile); //close results.txt file 
   if(lSize == 0) 
   {  
    _endthread(); //if the file is empty, exit the thread 
   } 
 
Figure 3.8: Write Results 
 
 If MAPS is unable to open the file or if the file is empty, the thread exits.  Once 
MAPS determines that matches need to be exfiltrated, MAPS checks the configuration 
setting for the hostname of the C2 server shown in Figure!3.9.  
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char* DNSNAME = "thisIsNotMalware.com"; 
char* C2IP = NULL; 
Figure 3.9: MAPS Configuration Settings 
!
 The C2 server’s hostname is thisIsNotMalware.com.  callC2 calls another function, 
queryC2 and perform a DNS query for the hostname to obtain the IP address of the C2 
server.  The attacker can change the IP address associated with the hostname from 
anywhere without making any changes to MAPS.  This flexibility allows the attacker to 
configure MAPS to target the defenses of a network and prevent a single IP address from 
showing up repeatedly in network communication logs.   
3.4 Test Environments and Experimental Design 
 In order to test MAPS, VMs residing on a virtual network are employed.  Virtual 
machines allow for each test to be run from the same system state, reducing the 
differences in the system that might occur between tests.  Utilizing a virtual network also 
allows for the experiment to be run without interfering network traffic or network noise 
from non-pertinent systems on the network. 
3.4.1 Database Setup 
 A MySQL database is employed on the C2 server to record the information sent 
from the clients.  Figure!3.10 shows the schema for the database. 
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Figure 3.10: C2 MySQL Database Schema 
!
 Each message sent from the client to the C2 server contains a MAC address, 
internal IP address, system username, email username, match words, and the number of 
occurrences of that match word.  The server itself also records the IP address of the 
incoming connection from the client.  First, the server queries the externalIP table to 
establish if this IP address has communicated with the C2 server before, determining if 
this is a new system.  This query is shown in Figure!3.11.   
 
  sprintf(command, "SELECT externalipID FROM externalIP WHERE ip = '%s';", ip); 
  if (mysql_query(conn, command)) { 
   fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", mysql_error(conn)); 
   exit(1); } 
  
Figure 3.11: MySQL Query for External IP Address 
!
The externalipID is returned if a record exists.  Otherwise, the new value is 
inserted into the externalIP table and the new externalipID is returned.  The server then 
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queries the system table to determine if the internal IP and external IP combination exists.  
This is shown in Figure!3.12.   
 
 sprintf(command, "SELECT ipID FROM system WHERE ip = '%s' AND externalID = %d;", 
  input[0], externalID); 
 if (mysql_query(conn, command)) { 
  fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", mysql_error(conn)); 
  exit(1); } 
 
Figure 3.12: MySQL Query for Internal/External IP Combination 
!
If it exists, the ipID of that system is returned.  Otherwise, a new entry is inserted 
in the system table, and the new ipID is returned.  Figure!3.13 shows the server querying 
the emailAddress table to determine if the email address exists in the database.   
 
  sprintf(command, "SELECT emailID FROM emailAddress WHERE fromAddress = '%s';", 
   input[loop]); 
  if (mysql_query(conn, command)) { 
   fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", mysql_error(conn)); 
   exit(1); } 
 
Figure 3.13: MySQL Query for Email Address 
!
The emailID is returned if a record is found.  Otherwise, a new entry is added to 
the emailAddress table and the new emailID is returned.  The server loops through each 
match word sent from the client, querying the profileWords table to get the profileID’s of 
each match.  This is shown in Figure!3.14. 
 
for(i = 0; i < numMatches; i++) 
{ 
  memset(command, '\0', commandMem); 
  sprintf(command, "SELECT profileID FROM profileWords WHERE word='%s';", 
   matches[i]); 
  if (mysql_query(conn, command)) { 
  fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", mysql_error(conn)); 
  exit(1); } 
 } 
 
Figure 3.14: MySQL Query for Profile Word ID's 
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!
Figure!3.15 shows the query of the match table with the identifiers to determine if 
a matchID exists for this combination.   
 
 sprintf(command, "SELECT matchID FROM matches WHERE profileID=%d AND emailID=%d AND 
   ipID=%d;", profileID, emailID, internalID); 
 if (mysql_query(conn, command)) { 
   fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", mysql_error(conn)); 
   exit(1);  } 
 
Figure 3.15: MySQL Query for Match ID 
!
If it exists, the numMatches count is updated with the new matches.  Otherwise, a 
new matches entry is added to the database with the profile word, email address, and the 
new system identifiers.   
3.4.2 Virtual Network Setup 
 Virtualization takes place on a single host system described in Section 3.3.1.  The 
virtualization software installed is VMware Workstation version 8.0.1.  The virtual 
network is a Host-only private network, which uses the host as the gateway for all nodes 
in the network.  Two operating systems are utilized.  The first operating system installed 
is the BackTrack 5 operating system described in Section 3.3.1.  The second operating 
system which is duplicated depending upon the experimental need, is running Windows 7 
64-bit Enterprise SP1 operating system with 1 processor, 1GB of RAM, and 30GB of 
hard drive space. 
3.4.2.1 VM IP addresses 
Each operating system is statically assigned an IP address.  This prevents IP 
conflicts from occurring with the DHCP assignment when reverting a VM to a snapshot.  
Two IP addresses are recorded during the running of the experiments: 
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• MAPS client records the IP address of the network interface on the system and 
sends it to the C2 server when matches are reported.  The C2 server parses the 
message storing client IP address in the internalIP table of the database. 
• During transmission, the C2 server records the IP address of the incoming 
connection.  The IP address is stored in the externalIP table of the database. 
 
Discrepancies between these two IP addresses cause a new system identifier to be 
added to the database instead of adding matches to the currently existing system 
identifier.  Figure!3.16 shows the network diagram for the virtual network.  The gateway 
is a virtual network interface on the host operating system. 
Both the external and internal IP addresses are stored in the database allowing the 
attacker to properly identify a system on a network that is employing Network Address 
Translation (NAT).  NAT permits a network to use private IP address space, allowing 
multiple computers to use the same Internet facing IP address.  With both the internal and 
external IP addresses, the attacker is able to identify a system behind a router employing 
NAT. 
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            Figure 3.16: Virtual Network Layout 
!
3.4.3 Experimental Overview 
 The experiments are designed to show both the functionality and utility of the 
concept to create network attack priority list.  A successful proof of concept is one that 
accurately reports matches that exist in both the email and the profile.  In order to 
validate MAPS, two different experiments are run.   
3.4.3.1 Functionality Experiment  
The functionality experiment utilizes a word list to randomly generate both emails 
and profile lists.  The purpose of this experiment is to demonstrate the functionality of 
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MAPS and it’s ability to properly collect emails, parse them for content, compare them to 
the profile, and exfiltrate the matches and system identifiers to the C2 server.   
3.4.3.2 Utility Experiment 
The utility experiment uses an email corpus while the profiles are generated from 
the online dictionary site having no predetermined relationship to the email dataset.  The 
purpose of this experiment is to determine MAPS ability to work with non-contrived 
input.     
3.4.3.3 Experiment VMs 
Two types of VMs are used for both the functionality and the utility experiment: 
C2 server and victim machine.  The BackTrack 5 operating system is used as the C2 
server and Windows 7 64-bit Enterprise SP1 operating systems serves as a victim 
machine.  There is one C2 server and the victim machines are duplicated as required for 
the experiment (i.e., if there are 3 victims running they are labeled as Victim1, Victim2, 
and Victim3).  ApateDNS [Man12], an application that allows for all DNS queries to 
return a single IP address, is running on all victim machines and the IP address of the C2 
server is returned for all DNS queries.  The C2 server is running the python script 
SimpleHTTPServer hosting maps.exe and profile.txt for all experiments. 
3.4.4 Functionality Experiment 
The functionality experiment uses the word list packaged with John the Ripper 
[Ope12] password cracker, edited to remove inappropriate language, consisting of 3075 
words.  This list is further referred to as the master profile.   
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3.4.4.1 C2 Server Setup 
! Figure!3.17 demonstrates the C2 server setup that is described in this section. 
 
!
Figure 3.17: C2 Server Setup 
!
!
The tool createProfile is run on the C2 server and accepts, as a command line 
argument, the number of unique words to use for the profile.  The specified number of 
words is pseudo-randomly selected from the master profile, using a properly seeded srand 
function from the standard C library to create a profile.  Once a profile is generated, the 
C2 server hosts maps.exe and profile.txt by executing the SimpleHTTPServer python 
script on port 31337.  The C2server program is executed with the name of the database to 
create, reads in the profile.txt, creates the database, and begins listening for connections 
on port 4001.   
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3.4.4.2 C2 Client Setup 
Figure!3.18 shows the folder structure created when startMaps.exe executes. 
 
 
Figure!3.18:!MAPS!Client!Folder!Structure!
 
Next, startMaps.exe performs a DNS query on the hardcoded hostname 
thisisnotmalware.com to determine the IP address of C2 server.  After successfully 
receiving an IP address, maps.exe and profile.txt are downloaded to the appropriate 
folders on the victim machine.  StartMaps.exe finishes execution by launching maps.exe 
as a background application with no window interface shown to the user.  When MAPS 
begins its execution, profile.txt is read into memory and stored as an array.  MAPS then 
begins monitoring the input.txt for emails.   
3.4.4.3 Functionality Experiment Data 
With MAPS running on Victim1, executing generateEmails.exe produces the 
emails for the experiment.  GenerateEmails.exe requires three arguments:  
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1. The number of emails to be generated. 
2. The amount of time generateEmails.exe should sleep in milliseconds between 
generation of emails. 
3. The number of words to randomly choose for the body of the email. 
 
 GenerateEmails.exe then stores the master profile list in an array and begins 
generating emails and writing them to the input folder in 
C:\Users\Victim1\Desktop\MALWARE\input\input.txt.  The number and length of the 
emails are specified by the first and third arguments of generateEmails.exe.  Once the 
email is written to input.txt, a copy of the email is written to the text file email.txt inside 
the log folder.  The copy of the email is utilized in the validation process.  After the email 
is written to both text files, generateEmails.exe executes the sleep command for the 
number of milliseconds specified by the second argument value of generateEmails.exe.  
After generateEmails.exe finishes generating the number of emails specified at execution, 
the experiment continues until MAPS reaches the next communication interval with the 
C2 server.  At this point the run is concluded and the results are evaluated.  
3.4.4.4 Workload 
In order to validate MAPS ability to successfully identify and report matches, 
three different user types are defined with each user type consisting of three factors.  
Table!3.1 lists the factors for each user. 
 
!
!
!
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Table 3.1: Functionality Experiment  - Email Generation 
User Type 
Total # of Emails to 
Generate 
Sleep Timer  
(ms) 
Email Length 
(Words) 
Minimal 100 1000 10 
Average 300 500 30 
Extreme 500 0 50 
  
The numbers chosen for each user is based upon both domain and design 
knowledge for this research.  While it is important to choose numbers that properly 
validate MAPS, the ability of MAPS to correctly identify the matches is of primary 
importance.  The extreme user numbers represent well above what MAPS would see in a 
deployed environment.  A profile size of fifty is chosen for all repetitions, and a new 
random profile is generated for each repetition.  This size is chosen based upon previous 
tests demonstrating that fifty profile words provides sufficient matches to show that 
MAPS is capable of identifying matches.  While it is apparent that a minimal user would 
not send one hundred emails a second in a production environment, the difference 
between the Minimal user and the Extreme user are of more interest to this research.  The 
number chosen for the Extreme user of five hundred emails with no delay between email 
generation is meant to represent a much higher work load then would be expected in a 
real environment.  The sleep timer is set to zero in the Extreme user case, showing that 
MAPS is capable of ingesting emails as quickly as they can be generated.  The Average 
user variables are chosen to demonstrate numbers halfway between the Minimal user and 
the Extreme user.   
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 Each user type and its associated variables are considered to be its own test.  Each 
test is then repeated five times.  Five repetitions are chosen in order to provide confidence 
that the accuracies obtained by the experiment are repeatable.  At the end of each 
repetition the logging data associated with that test and repetition combination is saved.  
The guest operating system for the victim client machine is reset to the beginning 
experiment system state to prevent any changes that occur during the repetition from 
affecting subsequent tests.  A duplicate database on the C2 server containing match 
information is created with the name of the test and repetition number (i.e., Minimal_r1 
represents the database name for the first repetition of the Minimal user test). 
3.4.4.5 Functionality Experiment Evaluation Technique 
In order to validate MAPS ability to successfully identify and report matches from 
a random profile with a random set of emails, several logs are collected on the Victim 
machine: 
 
• GenerateEmails.exe writes each randomly generated email to a text file called 
emails.txt along with the number associated with the order the email is 
generated. 
• Throughout the execution of maps.exe, actions that are taken by MAPS are 
recorded in log.txt which include: 
o Each email that is parsed along with the associated number of that 
email. 
o Each time the call home timer expires, the message that is sent back to 
the C2 server is recorded. 
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o Errors that occur during MAPS execution are recorded. 
• The C2 server adds the match words, number of match occurrences, as well as 
system and user identifying information to the database. 
 
Validation for the functionality experiment is a two-step process: 
 
1. Compare the number of emails reported by MAPS in log.txt against the number of 
emails generated by generateEmails.exe.  This is to ensure that all the emails 
generated are parsed by MAPS. 
2. Utilize the tool grep to determine the number of profile words that are present in 
the log.txt and email.txt.  These numbers are then compared with the match 
numbers existing in the database on the C2 server to validate that the matches are 
properly found and communicated. 
 
 This experiment is designed to show functionality of this proof of concept.  The 
resulting accuracies are analyzed using a 95 percent confidence interval (CI).   
3.4.5 Utility Experiment 
 The utility experiment focuses on the validation of MAPS capability to produce a 
network attack priority list by utilizing a real email data set and profiles that are 
meaningful.  For the purposes of this research, meaningful profiles are considered to be a 
list of words that bear a semantic relationship with one another.  The profiles that are 
chosen for this experiment have no pre-existing relationship with the email data set and 
no correlation is performed to determine which profiles should be used.  Other than the 
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emails and profiles used, the experimental setup for the utility experiment is identical to 
the set up for functionality experiment.   
A snapshot of the VM is taken at this point with all applications ready to be 
executed on the system.  This snapshot is entitled Begin.  After the chosen profile is 
uploaded to the C2 server, startmaps.exe is executed on the victim machine in order to set 
up the working environment for maps.exe.  Profile.txt as well as maps.exe is downloaded 
from the C2 server.  Maps.exe is then executed without any graphic interface or 
command line on the victim machine, ingesting the downloaded profile. 
3.4.5.1 Utility Experiment Profiles 
In order to properly validate MAPS’ ability to work with meaningful data, outside 
sources of the profiles are employed.  The profiles in this experiment are chosen from the 
Onelook dictionary website [One12].  Profiles are generated by searching for a master 
word.  Onelook.com consults 100,000+ dictionaries to return a list of words bearing 
semantic relationships to one another.  For the purposes of this research, the list of words 
returned including the master search word, are considered to be a meaningful profile.  
Five different profiles are generated for the utility experiment with the following search 
terms: 
 
1. Business 
2. Fraud 
3. Love 
4. Vacation 
5. Family 
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 These topics are chosen for their likelihood to be discussed in a corporation’s 
email system.  The top one hundred and fifty terms are taken from the results; terms with 
multiple words, symbols, and not commonly used words are human edited until fifty 
words remain with semantically related definitions.  For reproducibility, Appendix C 
includes all five profiles. 
3.4.5.2 Email Data Set 
The email data set in use for this experiment is a research data set from Enron 
[Enr03] email servers containing approximately a half a million emails organized by the 
name of the user.  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission made this data set public 
during their investigation.  The set contains an email folder for one hundred and fifty 
different users.  The utility experiment consists of ten victim machines that are labeled 
Victim1 through Victim10.  Each victim machine contains the emails from one randomly 
selected user.  The Ruby script parseEmail.rb is written to parse the content of each 
email, pulling out data that is useful to this research.  This information includes the from 
address of the user sending the email and the body of the email, which is further edited 
removing any punctuation, symbols, and additional whitespace.  The remaining header 
and meta information is not processed.  The script is run on each user file individually to 
create a file for each victim as well as run on all email folders collectively to produce the 
ex2output file, containing the parsed emails for all ten users.  As a result of this 
processing, various emails are missing information in either the from field or the body.  
These emails are excluded from the experiment.   
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3.4.5.3 Utility Experiment Execution 
With maps.exe running on the victim system, writeEmails.rb writes each email to 
input.txt.  The experiment is run with the five different profiles discussed in Section 
3.4.4.1.  As each repetition completes, the results are stored in a unique database on the 
C2 server bearing the name of the experiment and repetition number (i.e., ex2r1 for the 
first repetition of the utility experiment).  The victim VMs are reset to the beginning 
snapshot and the next profile is loaded onto the C2 server.   
3.4.5.4 Utility Experiment Evaluation Technique 
Validation of the utility experiment consists of determining the percentage of matches 
that MAPS is able to successfully identify.  There are several factors that potentially limit 
MAPS ability to identify a match; a subset of possible issues are listed below: 
 
• Software discrepancies.  Many software bugs have been discovered and remedied 
during the design process.  However, due to time limitations bugs may still exist 
that affect the results when utilizing the Enron dataset. 
• Regex is used to edit the 500,000 emails in the Enron data set.  With this size of 
data set, it is possible that some symbols may not have been adequately sanitized 
from the emails.  This can cause issues with matching. 
• Virtual Networking.  With virtual networking in use, it is difficult to troubleshoot 
packet transmission within the internal software of VMware.   
  
 Logs that are generated from this experiment exist in the form of database records 
containing the match information generated throughout the repetition and the logs 
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generated by MAPS as discussed in Section 3.4.3.5.  The grep utility is employed to 
search the email data set for each profile words.  Matches that are discovered by the grep 
utility that are not present in the C2 database or matches in the database that are not 
discovered by grep are considered to be misses.  Conversely, any matches that exist in the 
C2 database and are revealed by grep are considered to be accurate.  Overall accuracy is 
calculated by: 
 
 !""#$%"& = ! !"#$!!!"#!!"#$! "##$#!"#$!!!"# !!!!!                               (3.1) 
 
!
! A 95 percent CI is used in order to interpret the results of the utility experiment.  
Once the results of the experiment have been analyzed, network attack priority lists are 
created from the results.     
3.5 Summary 
 This chapter discussed in detail the overall design and design considerations for 
the research tool MAPS to be able to identify matches to profiles and create a network 
attack priority list.  The steps for setting up the development environment in order to 
develop MAPS and associated helper applications and scripts are discussed in detail.  
Finally, the testing environment and testing details as well as the validation process of the 
results are presented.  
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4. Results and Analysis 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter provides detailed results and analysis for the experiments outlined in 
Section 3.4.  Section 4.2 and Section 4.3 give detailed analysis of the functionality 
experiment and utility experiment respectively.  Section 4.4 examines characteristics of 
generating network attack priority lists.  A summary of the chapter is presented in Section 
4.6. 
4.2 Functionality Experiment  
The focus of the functionality experiment is to demonstrate MAPS ability to find, 
record, and report matches to the profile.   
4.2.1 Validation Overview 
Validation for the functionality experiment is accomplished using the Linux 
utilities grep version 2.5.1 and wc.  Each time generateEmails.exe creates an email and 
writes it to the input.txt file, it also creates another copy of that email and stores it in the 
\Desktop\log\email.txt file as well.  This email.txt file is considered to be the master list of 
emails for each repetition of the functionality experiment.   
4.2.1.1 Validation Scripts 
The script exportMatches.rb is executed on the C2 server and executes the code in 
Figure!4.1 to export the database containing the matches found by MAPS into a text file.   
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 res = dbh.query "SELECT profileWords.word, SUM(numMatches) as total FROM matches 
    INNER JOIN profileWords ON matches.profileID=profileWords.profileID 
    GROUP BY word;") 
 res.each do |row| 
   outFile.printf "%s\n%d\n", row[0], row[1] 
  end 
Figure 4.1: Export Matches MySQL Query 
!
Each match word and its corresponding number of matches found are outputted 
on consecutive lines for the entire database.  A text file, denoted by the name of the 
database the results are pulled from, is written to the matchFiles folder for each database.  
The script ex1Validate.rb automates the validation process for all repetitions of the 
functionality experiment simultaneously.  This script uses the grep utility to search 
email.txt for each profile word and records the number of times it appears in all randomly 
generated emails.  The profile words and the matchFile for the current repetition are each 
read into the arrays shown in Figure!4.2. 
 
matchFileArray = IO.readlines matchFile 
profileArray = IO.readlines profile 
Figure 4.2: Functionality Experiment Validation File Arrays 
!
4.2.1.2 Grep String 
Grep is then used with each index of the profileArray array in conjunction with 
the wc utility to count each occurrence.  Building the command issued to the system is 
shown in Figure!4.3. 
 
command = "grep -E -o '[ |#?]" + profileWord.chomp + " ' " + emailLogPath + " | wc -l" 
 
Figure 4.3: Grep Pattern Match String 
!
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The –E flag tells grep to interpret the pattern between the single quotes using 
extended regex, and the –o flag causes grep to only show the part of the line that matches 
the pattern.  The output of grep is then piped into the wc utility with the –l flag which 
causes the number of lines to be counted.  Extended grep is used because basic grep 
output only outputs the lines containing any matches to the pattern.  This causes multiple 
pattern matches on one line to be counted as one occurrence.  The usage of wc as well as 
the –o flag with extended grep returns an accurate count of multiple matches on a single 
line.  The regex pattern matches either a single space or 0 or 1 occurrences of the  # 
symbol followed by the profile word and ending with a single space.  The command 
variable is then issued as a system command, shown in Figure!4.4.   
 
count = `#{command}` 
Figure 4.4: System Grep Command 
!
The variable count receives the return value when command is issued to the system.  
count is a count of the profile words match occurrences.     
4.2.1.3 Match Criteria 
Each profile word in profileArray is then searched for in the matchFileArray array.  
When a match is found count is compared to the count in matchFileArray.  If the number of 
occurrences match then a hit is recorded for each occurrence.  Two cases are considered 
to be misses. 
 
• The profile word is found by grep but is not found by MAPS client.  A miss for 
each grep count of the profile word is counted.   
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• Grep and MAPS find a different number of occurrences of a profile word.  The 
difference between the grep count and the MAPS count are recorded as misses 
(i.e., the profile word ‘business’ is found by grep to have occurred 47 times and 
MAPS 32 times.  This is recorded as 32 hits and 15 misses). 
 
In the event that MAPS either records more occurrences than grep or records a 
profile word match that grep does not, manual verification is required.  Grep is expected 
to find all occurrences of the profile word, therefore if MAPS finds more matches than 
grep, it is likely that an error has occurred.  Accuracy is determined by Equation 3.1. 
4.2.2 Results & Analysis 
The functionality experiment consists of five repetitions for each of the three user 
types resulting in fifteen runs.  The 95 percent CI is calculated for each of the three users, 
and the results are shown in Table!4.1.  Due to domain knowledge and knowing the 
accuracies cannot be over 100 percent, the intervals are capped at 100. 
 
Table 4.1: Functionality Experiment Confidence Intervals 
User Mean Accuracy 95 percent C.I. Interval 
Minimal 100 ±0 [100] 
Average 99.87 ± 0.36 [99.510, 100] 
Extreme 99.898 ± 0.173 [99.725, 100] 
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4.2.2.1 Validation Error 
In the fifteen runs of the functionality experiment, there are three cases that 
MAPS produced one more match than grep: Average_r1, Extreme_r4, and Extreme_r5.  
These cases require manual verification to determine the cause of the additional match 
found by MAPS.  In each case, MAPS correctly identified the matches that are present in 
the email.  Grep does not support positive look-aheads, which allows regex to match a 
character followed by another character without consuming the second character.  
Because of this, the case when two of the same match words follow each other can not be 
detected.  For example, if the match word is “tomorrow”, the phrase “tomorrow 
tomorrow” is not detected.  The regex consumes the space between the two words and 
therefore the second tomorrow does not contain a space followed by the word followed 
by the space. This results in the pattern not matching the string.   
4.2.2.2 Manual Verification 
Due to the data set limit of 3075 words, the larger the number of words generated 
the more likely the case of two of the same word occurring.  This explains why it occurs 
twice in the extreme data set, while not occurring at all in the minimal data set.  Despite 
these discrepancies in validation, the 95 percent CI demonstrates that with random data 
sets, further runs would result in well over 99 percent accuracy.  This experiment 
successfully demonstrates that even at different user levels MAPS is able to successfully 
identify the profiles and report the matches back to the C2 server with a verifiable 
accuracy above 99 percent. 
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4.3 Utility Experiment 
The utility experiment uses an email corpus and meaningful profiles to  
demonstrate MAPS’ ability to accurately identify matches with non-contrived input. 
4.3.1 Validation Overview 
Validating the utility experiment requires confirming the communication between 
the MAPS client applications on the ten victim machines and the C2 server.  The 
validation of this data takes place in a similar manner to that of the functionality 
experiment with the following difference.  All ten email files have been consolidated into 
one single file: ex2output.  Grep is used on this file just like the functionality experiment 
with grep matches being considered the correct number of matches.  The same grep 
string, match criteria, and accuracy formula is applied to the results of the utility 
experiment.  
4.3.2 Results & Analysis 
The utility experiment consists of 5 different profiles applied to 10 different 
victim clients.  Each victim client contains a unique set of emails to be written.  This 
results in 5 runs of the experiment.  Table!4.2 describes the results of the utility 
experiment. 
 
!
!
!
!
!
! 66!
Table 4.2: Utility Experiment Validation 
Run Grep Hits MAPS Hits Misses Accuracy 
1 56004 54652 1352 97.586 
2 1389 1326 63 95.464 
3 9628 9484 144 98.504 
4 17508 17236 272 98.445 
5 24472 23756 716 97.074 
   
4.3.2.1 Data Verification 
All five runs of the utility experiment show accuracies above 95 percent.  In order 
to provide confidence in these accuracies, the first run is repeated three times.  The 
results for all three repetitions of run one are shown in Table!4.3.  
 
Table 4.3: Utility Experiment - Run One Repetitions 
Repetition Grep Hits MAPS Hits Misses Accuracy 
1 56004 54652 1352 97.586 
2 56004 54655 1349 97.591 
3 56004 54655 1349 97.591 
 
A 95 percent CI is calculated for the three repetitions.  The mean accuracy for the 
repetitions is 97.589, and the 95 percent CI is 97.586 to 97.591.  This shows the mean of 
additional repetitions for this run should fall between 97.586 percent and 97.591 percent.  
These repetitions verify that MAPS is able to repeatedly identify a high percentage of 
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matches in the Enron email corpus.  Along with the functionality experiment, these 
results confirm that with a email corpus and meaningful profiles, MAPS is able to 
effectively match the profiles and report them to the C2 server.    
4.4 Network Attack Priority Lists 
Network attack priority lists are generated for the systems in the utility 
experiment.  In order to create the network attack priority lists for each run, the matches 
stored in the C2 database are used.  
4.4.1 Building Network Attack Priority Lists 
In order to build the network attack priority list, the MySQL query in Figure 4.5 is 
issued to each run’s database: 
 
SELECT system.uname AS User_Name, system.ip AS Internal_IP, 
SUM(matches.numMatches) AS Matches FROM system INNER JOIN matches ON 
system.ipID=matches.ipID GROUP BY matches.ipID ORDER BY Matches DESC; 
 Figure 4.5: Network Attack Priority List MySQL Query 
!
This query selects relevant information from the database for identifying each 
system, such as the system username and internal IP address.  For each system in the run, 
the total number of matches are summed together and displayed in the Matches column. 
The Matches column is sorted in the table from most matches to least matches.  Using 
this query, the network attack priority lists are generated.  This list shows the attacker 
what order to attack systems on the network. 
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The top two systems for each run of the utility experiment are listed below in 
Table!4.4 along with the IP address and the number of matches associated with each 
system. 
 
Table 4.4: Utility Experiment Network Attack Priority Lists - Top 2 Results 
Run Profile Search Word System IP Address Matches 
1 Business 
Victim5 192.168.87.15 23551 
Victim4 192.168.87.14 11975 
2 Fraud 
Victim5 192.168.87.15 633 
Victim4 192.168.87.14 309 
3 Love 
Victim4 192.168.87.14 1879 
Victim5 192.168.87.15 1720 
4 Vacation 
Victim4 192.168.87.14 4935 
Victim5 192.168.87.15 4161 
5 Family 
Victim5 192.168.87.15 9487 
Victim4 192.168.87.14 5974 
  
Victim4 and Victim5 have the highest number of matches for all the runs in the 
utility experiment.  This is related to the fact that they have significantly more words in 
their respective email files than the other victims.  In order to obtain matches on 
uncorrelated data, profiles describing common topics of discussion are chosen.  This 
results in more matches occurring in the emails that contain more words.  Since each 
profile word is considered to be significant, the total number of matches per topic 
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determines the network attack priority list.  Refining the profiles could provide a more 
robust network attack priority list.  However, profile generation is beyond the scope of 
this research. 
Table!4.5 shows the network attack priority list for the first run of the utility 
experiment.     
 
Table 4.5: Utility Experiment – Business Profile 
User_Name Internal_IP Matches 
Victim 5 192.168.87.15 23551 
Victim 4 192.168.87.14 11975 
Victim 1 192.168.87.11 4293 
Victim 2 192.168.87.12 2848 
Victim 9 192.168.87.19 2709 
Victim 10 192.168.87.20 2534 
Victim 8 192.168.87.18 2459 
Victim 3 192.168.87.13 1959 
Victim 6 192.168.87.16 1477 
Victim 7 192.168.87.17 855 
  
 As shown in Table!4.5, Victim5 clearly has the most matches to the business 
profile out of the ten systems used for run one of the utility experiment.  This data 
provides a basic means of identifying a system on the network that has users that are 
discussing topics via email relating to business.   
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4.4.2 Email User Identification 
Issuing a further database query results in more detailed information about the 
users on the system being obtained.  Looking at the first run of the utility experiment in 
Table!4.5, Victim5 has the most hits.  By issuing the query in Figure!4.6, a list of email 
addresses associated with Victim5 and the number of matches for each user is displayed. 
 
SELECT emailAddress.fromAddress AS Email, SUM(matches.numMatches) AS Matches FROM matches 
INNER JOIN emailAddress ON matches.emailID=emailAddress.emailID INNER JOIN system ON 
matches.ipID=system.ipID WHERE matches.ipID=5 GROUP BY matches.emailID ORDER BY Matches; 
Figure 4.6: Identify Top Email Matches 
!
 While this query results in one hundred and thirty-three email address matches, 
the top four results are likely of the most interest to an attacker looking for matches on 
the business profile. 
 
Table 4.6: Utility Experiment – Business Profile Breakdown by Top 4 Users 
Email Address Matches 
Sarah.palmer@enron.com 15020 
m..schmidt@enron.com 3834 
Karen.denne@enron.com 1338 
Courtney.votaw@enron.com 1313 
 
 Table!4.6 shows that 21,505 matches out of the 23,551 matches come from 4 
users, with the sarah.palmer@enron.com email address clearly having the majority of the 
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matches.  The attackers can focus their efforts on these users, saving valuable hours and 
providing a clear starting point to begin harvesting information.   
4.5 Summary 
 This chapter provides details on the results, validation, and analysis of both 
experiments performed and discussed in Section 3.5.  Final results show MAPS ability to 
identify a high percentage of matches with both a random data set and real world input.  
With MAPS functionality demonstrated, the utility of MAPS is shown by further 
querying the match database to determine which systems contribute the most matches for 
each system.  The systems rank from most matches to least matches, giving the attacker a 
network attack priority list to plan a computer network attack.  In addition to the network 
attack priority list, further analysis of the results show the ability to determine which 
email users contribute the most to the profile matches.  Experimentation successfully 
demonstrates both the functionality and utility of MAPS.
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5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
5.1 Overview 
 This chapter concludes the research presented in this thesis.  The following 
sections discuss the application of this research, future works, and a summary of the 
thesis. 
5.2 Significance of Research 
 People have grown accustomed to communicating electronically for many 
different reasons.  With limited resources and technical proficiencies available, it is 
important to utilize skills in the most efficient manner as possible.  This research 
highlights a manner in which automation can be employed to focus limited resources in 
other areas.  The use of profiles to describe information can be created by non-technical 
analysts, while attackers can more efficiently attack the network.  This research shows 
that information profiles aid in the targeting of computers on a network without human 
interaction on the systems.   
 This research successfully demonstrates that a ranking of computer targets by 
comparing real time user email traffic from the perspective of the users workstation 
against pre-determined profiles can be implemented. 
5.3 Recommendations for Future Research 
 This thesis is a small part in the research to increase the efficiency of attackers on 
computer networks.  Some proposed modifications to the implementation are as follows: 
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• Increasing the complexity of the profiles utilized to determine activity on the 
system.  While this research did not focus on how the profiles are generated, the 
utilization of more specific profiles will eliminate many false positives and 
negatives.  For this research to be employed in an actual attack operation, profiles 
would need to be more specific to the type of information that is being sought.  
• A much higher presence will be necessary on the target system.  In order to truly 
have situational awareness of what is occurring on the system, it is necessary to 
have more information then what can be obtained via email alone.  Activities such 
as web browsing, document creation, remote access logs, etc. can indicate the 
information residing on the workstation.    
• A more robust means of parsing the content.  This research focuses on text-based 
content that could be compared to a text based profile.  With multiple means of 
gathering data, research on content parsing to produce meaningful results is 
necessary.  In addition, the parser must properly handle errors. 
• Increased stealth components.  While MAPS employs some basic customization 
options for the network being attacked, stealth components would be required for 
a deployable tool.  Rootkits, covert transmission mediums, and a decreased 
executable size reduces the likelihood of discovery.    
5.4 Summary 
 This research identifies means with which an attacker can increase the efficiency 
of operations against computer information systems, without having to increase their 
technical work force.  This is achieved by defining and implementing the following steps: 
!
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1. Collect email traffic on a windows workstation and compare the emails to a 
predefined profile sending the matches to the C2 server.  MAPS software is 
implemented using the C programming language and runs on the Windows 
operating system.   
2. Verify the ability to successfully identify and report matches from a random 
profile with a random set of emails.  Grepping the contents of the email output 
files and comparing these results against the C2 database determines MAPS 
ability to identify matches. 
3. Verify the research goal by loading semantically-related profiles and utilizing the 
Enron email corpus [Enr03] to determine if a network attack priority listing can 
be derived.  Profiles generated by searching onelook.com for topics are run 
against the email data set from the Enron corporation.  Validation takes place by 
demonstrating that MAPS is able to correctly identify 90 percent of the matches 
and MySQL queries are used to present the information via a network attack 
priority list. 
 
This research succeeded in realizing the goals and demonstrates a foundation for 
automating the collection of information from a system for the purpose of determining 
the topics of discussion of the users on the system.
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Appendix A: Functionality Experiment Results 
!
Run Grep hits MAPS Hits Misses Accuracy 
Minimal_r1 13 13 0 100 
Minimal_r2 11 11 0 100 
Minimal_r3 12 12 0 100 
Minimal_r4 14 14 0 100 
Minimal_r5 10 10 0 100 
Average_r1 154 155 1 99.351 
Average_r2 152 152 0 100 
Average_r3 137 137 0 100 
Average_r4 161 161 0 100 
Average_r5 146 146 0 100 
Extreme_r1 365 365 0 100 
Extreme_r2 385 385 0 100 
Extreme_r3 374 374 0 100 
Extreme_r4 394 395 1 99.746 
Extreme_r5 392 393 1 99.745 
!
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Appendix B: Experiment Confidence Intervals 
!
Functionality!Experiment:!n=5!
!
Run! Mean! SD! SE! CI! Range!
Minimal! 100! 0! 0! 0! 100!
Average! 99.8702! 0.29024162! 0.1298! 0.36038257! 99.5!–!100.2!
Extreme! 99.8982! 0.13939584! 0.06233971! 0.1730828! 99.7!–!100.1!
!
!
Utility!Experiment!Run!1:!n=3!
!
Mean! SD! SE! CI! Range!
.97589! 3.0927EL05! 1.7856EL05! 7.6828EL05! 0.97581L0.97597!
! 77!
Appendix C: Utility Experiment Profiles 
!
Run!1! Run!2! Run!3! Run!4! Run!5!
Business! Fraud! Love! Vacation! Family!
account!
activity!
advertising!
affair!
affairs!
agency!
bank!
banking!
brokerage!
business!
byplay!
carrier!
clientele!
commerce!
commercial!
company!
competition!
concern!
construction!
corp!
corporation!
custom!
deal!
enterprise!
establishment!
firm!
house!
industrial!
industry!
maker!
management!
manager!
manufacturer!
manufacturing!
mercantile!
occupation!
office!
open!
bite!
charlatan!
cheat!
collateral!
colluder!
conveyance!
cross!
deceit!
deception!
defraud!
defraudment!
dishonesty!
dupery!
election!
extrinsic!
fake!
faker!
fiddle!
fleece!
foist!
fraud!
fraudless!
fraudulence!
fraudulent!
gyp!
hoax!
hustle!
imposter!
impostor!
ingannation!
intrinsic!
mulct!
namedropper!
pretender!
pseudo!
pull!
racket!
ringer!
adoration!
adore!
affection!
agape!
amorous!
ardor!
attachment!
attraction!
bang!
bed!
beloved!
bonk!
charity!
cherish!
crush!
dear!
dearest!
devotion!
dote!
enjoy!
feeling!
fornicate!
f***!
heart!
honey!
hump!
infatuation!
intrigue!
jazz!
know!
liking!
love!
loved!
loveless!
lovely!
lovemaking!
lover!
loves!
accomplished!
appeal!
away!
ball!
beach!
condos!
cottage!
country!
cruise!
dacha!
down!
ego!
eholiday!
fab!
fabulous!
furlough!
getaway!
honeymoon!
idyllic!
kiss!
leave!
leisure!
look!
midsummer!
mind!
month!
nag!
outing!
pass!
picnic!
plate!
playground!
rainy!
recess!
rental!
resort!
resorts!
rested!
ancestry!
baby!
blood!
blue!
brood!
category!
children!
clan!
class!
common!
descended!
descent!
domestic!
dynasty!
familial!
families!
family!
feline!
fellowship!
folk!
genealogy!
genera!
group!
heirloom!
home!
homefold!
hominid!
house!
household!
ilk!
kin!
kinfolk!
kinsfolk!
kinsperson!
line!
lineage!
marriage!
matriarch!
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operation!
organization!
partnership!
patronage!
practice!
publishing!
sector!
shop!
stage!
trade!
tycoon!
work!
!
scam!
sham!
shark!
surreptitious!
swindle!
trickery!
trickster!
trumpery!
unmasking!
victimize!
watcher!
wrench!
!
loving!
passion!
passionate!
patriotism!
philanthropy!
platonic!
romance!
romantic!
sc***!
strong!
unrequited!
worship!
!
sightsee!
sixthly!
spa!
spend!
subject!
then!
throw!
trips!
vacation!
vacationed!
vacationer!
vacationing!
!
menage!
name!
parentage!
parents!
patriarch!
people!
related!
sept!
shrew!
stock!
taxonomic!
tribe!
!
!
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